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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 980126-CA 
v. : 
PATRICK L. STANLEY : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals his convictions of one count of distributing or arranging to 
distribute methamphetamine in a drug-free zone with a prior conviction, a first degree 
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1998), and one count of 
possession or use of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone with a prior conviction, a first-
degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1998). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing defendant's proposed 
instruction on entrapment and giving the jury an instruction 
that tracked the statutory language, where Utah's appellate 
courts have approved entrapment instructions that follow the 
statute's words? 
"An appeal challenging a trial court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction or 
claiming that a jury instruction incorrectly states the law presents a question of law which 
we review for correctness." State v. Tinoco. 860 P.2d 988, 989-90 (Utah App. 1993) 
(citing State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993)). "It is within the trial court's 
discretion . . . to select between two accurate but different jury instructions." State v. 
Gallegos. 849 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Pedersen. 802 P.2d 1328, 
1332 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1990)). "Even if we find an error, 
however, we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability the error 
affected the outcome of his case." Tmoco, 860 P.2d at 990 (citing State v. Garrett, 849 
P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Did the trial court plainly err in instructing the jury that 
whether defendant had a prior drug conviction was an element 
of the offense of possession or use of a controlled substance 
where no settled Utah appellate law has directly addressed the 
issue? 
To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (i) an error 
occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). If any one of these elements is missing, there is no plain 
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error. Id. at 1209. 
3. Was Officer Terry's unequivocal, uncontroverted testimony, 
based on personal knowledge, that the motel in which defendant 
committed the offenses was within a drug-free zone sufficient to 
prove that element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt? 
In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction, an 
appellate court reviews the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. The court reverses a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." 
State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983): see also State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 
543 (Utah 1994); State v. Harlev. 982 P.2d 1145,1147 (Utah App. 1999). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following are set forth in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1), (2) (1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Defendant was charged by amended information with one count of distributing or 
arranging to distribute methamphetamine in a drug-free zone with a prior conviction, a 
^ h e facts, unless otherwise stated, are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. 
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first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1998), and one 
count of possession or use of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone with a prior 
conviction, a first-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) (1998) (R. 24). 
Before trial, defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the grounds of entrapment 
(R. 29). The trial court held a hearing on the issue, and denied the motion (R. 209 at 91-
94). 
A jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 213 at 46-47). The trial court sentenced 
him to two concurrent terms of five years to life in prison, and a fine of $1,000 with a 
surcharge of $850 (R. 214 at 9-10). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 174). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Edie Randall knew defendant as a drug connection (R. 212 at 23, 52). In fact, she 
owed him $350 for a drug deal (R. 212 at 24, 42). On March 27, 1997, Edie landed in 
Emery County Jail on drug charges. Eager to free herself, she told Officer J.D. Mangum 
of the Carbon-Emery County Drug Task Force that she would set up a controlled buy 
from defendant in exchange for release from jail (R. 211 at 141). 
Edie had acted as a confidential informant in approximately 170 controlled buys 
during the previous six to seven months (R. 211 at 178, 212 at 29). Mangum told Edie 
that the drug task force would not pay her or help her out on her drug charges, but that 
they would facilitate her pretrial release on her own recognizance in exchange for her 
4 
participation in the buy (R. 211 at 142, 179). 
Mangum was with Edie at the jail when she telephoned defendant and left 
messages on his pager (R. 211 at 142,212 at 34). When defendant called her back, she 
asked him if he had any methamphetamine, whether he could meet with her, and how 
much money she should bring (R. 212 at 24). At Mangum's request, Edie asked to buy 
two ounces of methamphetamine (R. 211 at 144).2 Defendant told Edie the drugs would 
cost $1,200 (R. 211 at 143, 212 at 24). He brought up the subject of the money she owed 
him, and asked her if she had the money. She told him she did (R. 212 at 35-36). They 
arranged to meet in the parking lot of the Spanish Fork K-Mart at 9 p.m.(R. 211 at 149, 
212 at 25). Edie told defendant that she would be accompanied by a drug dealer from 
Price who would drive drive her to the K-Mart and make the buy (R. 211 at 147, R. 212 at 
25). 
Officer Mangum picked up $1,200 from the task force in Springville (R. 211 at 
145). He and Edie drove to the K-Mart. Defendant showed up a few minutes later. 
Defendant asked to speak to Edie privately. They stood over by defendant's car and 
talked for a few minutes out of Mangum's hearing (R. 211 at 150, 212 at 37). Edie then 
returned to Mangum's car and said that defendant wanted to go get some dinner from 
2Two ounces of methamphetamine is a large quantity. The officer decided to ask 
for two ounces because "[defendant] didn't want to come clear to Spanish Fork for small 
dollar value . . . " (R. 211 at 146). Also, since Mangum was posing as a drug dealer, he 
needed to request a quantity large enough to re-sell (id,). 
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Taco Time (R. 211 at 151). 
Defendant returned a few minutes later and he, Edie, and Mangum stood outside in 
the parking lot (id.). Defendant discussed the terms of the deal with Mangum (R. 211 at 
152). He told Mangum he didn't have the methamphetamine with him and he would have 
to return to Salt Lake to get it (R. 211 at 155). The officer was not surprised that 
defendant did not bring the drugs with him: "Lots of times on that kind of quantity, and 
me being a new person, sometimes they don't bring it. They want to see what kind of 
deal they are getting into before they get ripped off themselves" (R. 211 at 155). 
Defendant told Mangum that two ounces of methamphetamine would cost $1,200 
(R. 211 at 152). Mangum showed defendant the money "to let him know I'm legitimate" 
(R. 211 at 154). Defendant wanted Mangum to "front" the entire amount (R. 211 at 152). 
Mangum replied that since he didn't know defendant, there was no way he was going to 
let that kind of money go (id.). 
Defendant then asked Mangum if Mangum was going to "stand good for [Edie's] 
debt" (R. 211 at 153). Mangum was "really surprised, because I hadn't heard anything 
about the debt. I didn't know there was any debt to be had" (id.). Mangum refused to 
take care of Edie's debt, but allowed that "[w]e might work something out for part of it" 
(R.211atl54). 
Defendant told Mangum that he didn't want to drive all the way back to Spanish 
Fork from Salt Lake, and that he would meet them halfway in Lehi (R. 211 at 153-54, 
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156). He told them to get a motel room, and then page him to relay the room and phone 
numbers (R. 211 at 154). Mangum gave defendant $100 to seal the deal (R. 211 at 154). 
Mangum and Edie went to the Timpanogos Inn in Lehi and obtained two adjoining 
rooms (R. 211 at 159-60). Mangum and Edie waited in one room, and officers 
monitoring the transaction set up surveillance in the other (id.). Other officers watched 
the roads leading to the motel (R. 211 at 160-61). 
Edie called defendant's pager (R. 211 at 159). About 20 to 25 minutes later, he 
called back (R. 211 at 160). A few minutes later, he knocked on the door (R. 211 at 161). 
Defendant spoke with Edie alone in the bathroom for a few minutes (R. 211 at 161-62). 
Mangum could not hear the details of that conversation (id.). When defendant and Edie 
emerged, defendant told Mangum that he could only get half the agreed-upon amount, 
because his friends had already sold the rest (R. 211 at 162). He said that he would get 
the rest and sell it to Mangum at a later date (id.). He said Mangum could give him $550 
and keep the $50 Mangum had paid for the motel room (id.). 
Defendant gave Mangum the methamphetamine and took the money (R. 211 at 
167-163). Then, as Mangum was getting ready to give the other officers the "bust 
signal," defendant took out a black plastic case containing a small bag of 
methamphetamine (R. 211 at 163). Defendant crushed some of the drug and scraped it 
into the case (R. 211 at 163). He handed the small bag to Edie (id.). Then, as Mangum 
recalled, "all of a sudden he took a line out and snorted" the powdered methamphetamine 
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in the plastic case QdL). At that point, the other officers burst into the room and arrested 
defendant (R. 211 at 165). They found Zigzag papers in his pocket, as well as 
"numerous small baggies" (R. 211 at 305-06). 
Officers searched the red Subaru wagon defendant was driving and found a 
container of denatured alcohol, a butane torch, razor blades, and marijuana seeds (R. 211 
at 259). According to state crime lab chemist Dr. David Murdock, denatured alcohol and 
butane torches are often used in methamphetamine manufacturing (R. 211 at 244).3 
Butane torches are also used to vaporize methamphetamine so that users can inhale the 
drug (R. 211 at 260). 
Defendant did not own the red Subaru, but Edie had seen him driving it one or two 
times previously (R. 212 at 162). And, one week before defendant's arrest, Officer 
Harold Terry observed Edie and defendant conversing window-to-window in two parked 
3Methamphetamine production involves the use of iodine, red phosphorus and 
other chemicals not soluble in alcohol (R. 211 at 244-45). Denatured alcohol is used to 
separate methamphetamine from the other chemicals used in methamphetamine 
manufacture. The alcohol is mixed with methamphetamine precursors (id.). Although 
methamphetamine dissolves in the alcohol, the other chemicals do not (id.). When the 
mixture is poured through a filter, methamphetamine and alcohol pass through, and the 
insoluble chemicals remain in the filter (id.). The alcohol-methamphetamine mixture is 
then heated with a propane or butane torch (id.). The alcohol evaporates readily, leaving 
methamphetamine crystals (id.). 
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cars in Lehi (R. 212 at 165). Defendant was sitting in the drivers' seat of the red Subaru 
GcL).4 
'What Are You Talking About? " 
At trial, defendant claimed that he had known Edie for two or three months before 
his arrest (R. 212 at 72). He said he had visited Edie's home in Price on a couple of 
occasions and had performed home and auto repairs for her (id.). He said he had loaned 
$350 to Edie so she could make a payment on her trailer (R. 212 at 75).5 
Defendant claimed that when he first spoke to Edie by telephone on March 27, she 
announced that she could pay him the money she "borrowed" (R. 212 at 80). He further 
asserted that she said, "I need you to bring me an ounce" (id.). He claimed he was 
"shocked" by the request, replying, "What are you talking about?" (id.). He nevertheless 
agreed to meet her (R. 212 at 81). 
Defendant maintained that when he spoke to Edie privately in the K-Mart parking 
lot, she seemed "nervous or scared," "distraught," and "almost started crying . . . like she 
was desperate" (R. 212 at 86, 90-91). Defendant said Edie told him "I owe this guy 
4Defendant testified that before his arrest, he had "never been to Lehi in [his] life" 
(R. 212 at 96, 141). 
defendant's testimony on this point was corroborated by Suzanne Webb, who 
claimed that she was present when defendant loaned Edie the $350 (R. 212 at 63). 
Although Webb testified that "(j]ust basically it [the details of the loan transaction] was 
kind of between the three of us [Edie, defendant, and Webb]," the prosecutor and defense 
counsel stipulated that Ryan Webb and Tiffany Warner would testify that they too had 
witnessed the loan transaction (R. 212 at 63, 67-68). 
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[referring to Mangum] and I need to get him an ounce and I don't know what he'll do if I 
can't pay him" (R. 212 at 86). Defendant said he was worried for Edie because he had 
"heard lots of stories about drug dealers . . . I mean, the TV.. ."(R. 212 at 87-88). He 
explained that his worries stemmed from an incident 20 years previously when a woman 
in his neighborhood owed money to drug dealers and "[t]hey cut off her toe with a pair of 
bolt cutters" (R. 212 at 87-90). Defendant said he offered to drive Edie away, but she 
declined, saying "I can't. He knows where I live" (R. 212 at 90-91). Defendant said 
Edie told him she thought Mangum had a gun (R. 212 at 90). 
Defendant claimed he initially refused to help Edie, telling her he did not have any 
methamphetamine (R. 212 at 86, 91). He said that despite his repeated statements to 
Mangum that he did not have any methamphetamine, Mangum made numerous requests 
for the drug (R. 212 at 93-95). Defendant said he ultimately verbally agreed to "see if he 
could help" Mangum and Edie (R. 212 at 95). Nevertheless, he claimed that he remained 
undecided whether to follow through until Mangum ran up to his car as he prepared to 
drive away, handed him $100, and said "Here, this is for her debt, and that seals the deal" 
(R. 212 at 97). Defendant said that "[a]t that point . . . I kind of thought, 'He's obligating 
me. He's got her and he's obligating me' (id.). 
Defendant stated he returned to Salt Lake and "started calling around seeing if 
there was any way or anybody that knew how to procure [methamphetamine]" (R. 212 at 
98). He obtained the drugs, then met Mangum and Edie at the motel. He stated that after 
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the drugs and money were exchanged, he took out "a little straw" that had been in the 
plastic box and "and I went (demonstrating)" (R. 212 at 104).6 
Defendant testified that the propane torch found in the Subaru was probably used 
by the vehicle's owner "to refmish, or like, antique and burn furniture" (R. 212 at 107). 
He opined that the denatured alcohol was used to thin shellac (R. 212 at 108). He said he 
used Zigzag papers "to repair my [broken] cigarettes" (R. 212 at 109). 
Defendant acknowledged that he was convicted of drug possession four years 
earlier after police found in his car "a little bindle with methamphetamine, approximately 
5- to $10 worth, I would say" (R. 212 at 110). He also had a conviction for making a 
false report to a police officer (R. 212 at 110-11). 
On cross examination, defendant stated that he made calls from "five or six" pay 
phones to obtain the drugs (R. 212 at 123). In his search for drugs, defendant claimed to 
have called a "Jayson," two "Bills," and a "Mark": 
Defendant: I called somebody named Jayson. 
Prosecutor: How did you know him? 
Defendant: From my tree service. I had just met him. I was on a job and 
he lived down the street or something. 
Prosecutor: Okay. What's his last name? 
Defendant: I don't know. 
Prosecutor: And yet you felt like he might be someone that could get you 
6Defendant apparently demonstrated that he blew the methamphetamine powder 
out of the box, as opposed to snorting it. After defendant testified, the prosecutor recalled 
Officer Mangum and asked him whether defendant could have been blowing the powder 
out of the box (R. 212 at 173). Mangum replied that he saw defendant inhale the 































some methamphetamine, is that right? 
I was taking a shot in the dark. 
Who else did you call? 
I called a guy named Bill in West Valley. 
What is Bill's last name? 
I don't know. 
Okay. Who else? 
There was a couple people that weren't home. 
Okay. Who were they? 
There's another guy named Bill. 
What was his last name? 
I don't know. These are just people. These are not personal 
friends. So . . . 
Okay. Who else? 
I don't - and Mark. 
What's his last name? 
I don't know. 
You don't know his either? Mr. Stanley, how did you look 
these people's number up in the phone book if you don't 
know their last name? 
Well, I looked the first one up -
Now, you said you called a couple of these people from the 
phone book? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). Uh-huh (affirmative). 
How did you look them up if you didn't know their last name, 
sir? 
Well, Mark, I looked up under Andy's Garage, because that's 
where he worked. 
So you knew him well enough to know where he worked? 
Right. 
But you don't know his last name? 
No. 
He worked at Andy's Garage? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
And Andy's Garage was open at 10 o'clock at night? 
No. That was one of the people that I couldn't get ahold of. 
(R. 212 at 123-25, Addendum B). 
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Defendant testified he finally obtained the methamphetamine from a "Joe 
Martinez" (R. 212 at 121). He did not know where "Joe" lived (]dL). And, although he 
had not seen "Joe" for four or five years, "Joe" did not require defendant to pay for the 
methamphetamine (R. 212 at 121,142). 
Officer Mangum's and Edie 's Testimony 
Mangum testified that he had received training in entrapment, and that he did not 
see anything in his and Edie's transactions with defendant that he felt was improper (R. 
211 at 196). Mangum said that in his conversation with defendant in the K-Mart parking 
lot, he did not ask defendant to get methamphetamine; instead, defendant volunteered to 
go up to Salt Lake and get the drug (R. 211 at 186). Furthermore, Mangum said he did 
not observe Edie make repeated requests for the drug (R. 211 at 196). Mangum said 
defendant did not exhibit any reluctance to do the deal (R. 211 qt 157, 196). 
Edie testified that she never told defendant that she was afraid of Mangum (R. 212 
at 27). She said defendant never said he didn't want to sell the drugs, and he showed no 
reluctance to engage in the transaction (id.). She did not recall having to ask him for the 
drugs more than once (R. 212 at 28). She denied telling defendant she was worried for 
her safety, and said she did not display any concern to defendant (R. 212 at 38). She said 
she did not tell defendant Mangum was armed, or that Mangum knew where she lived (R. 
212 at 38-39). She denied that defendant told her that he could drive her away from the 
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parking lot (id.). She said defendant never loaned her money for a trailer payment, and 
that, in fact, her trailer had been paid off since June 1996 (R. 212 at 42, 162). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it refused to give 
defendant's proposed jury instruction on entrapment. Defendant's proposed instruction 
included examples of entrapment set forth in State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 503 (Utah 
1979). However, the instruction given in this case quoted the statutory language almost 
verbatim. The statute itself incorporates the appropriate objective test to be employed by 
the trier of fact in determining whether entrapment occurred. Since the jury instruction 
accurately stated the law, the trial court did not err in giving it to the jury. 
Point II. Defendant further maintains that the trial court committed plain error in 
instructing the jury that a prior drug conviction was an element of possession or use of a 
controlled substance. He also claims that he was denied his right to effective assistance 
of counsel because his attorney failed to object to the instruction. However, the case cited 
by defendant in support of his contention is distinguishable on its facts. Since there is no 
settled Utah appellate law on the exact issue defendant raises, any "error" could not have 
been plain to the trial court. In any event, the alleged error was harmless because 
defendant's prior convictions were already properly in evidence. Defendant's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim likewise fails because no error occurred and no prejudice 
resulted. 
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Point III. Finally, defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed within a drug-free zone. 
However, the prosecutor presented competent, believable testimony from Officer Terry, 
who testified from personal knowledge that the motel in which defendant sold the drugs 
was within 1,000 feet from a school, a McDonald's playland, and a ball field. Viewed in 
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, that testimony was sufficient to establish 
that the crimes occurred within a drug-free zone. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION 
ON ENTRAPMENT BECAUSE THE INSTRUCTION 
GIVEN ACCURATELY STATED THE LAW 
Defendant complains that the trial court erred in not giving his proposed 
instruction on entrapment. He claims that the instruction given failed to inform the jury 
that the test for entrapment employs an objective standard which focuses on the conduct 
of the government agents as opposed to the predisposition of the defendant to commit the 
offense (R. 143, Addendum C). Appellant's Brief at 24. 
Defendant is correct that entrapment is assessed under an objective standard. 
Contrary to defendant's claims, however, that objective standard is embodied in the 
language of the entrapment statute. Since the instruction given to the jury repeated the 
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statute's language nearly verbatim, the jury was properly instructed on the law of 
entrapment. 
Jury Instruction no. 11 stated: 
It is a defense that the defendant was entrapped into committing the 
offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person directed by or acting 
in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to 
obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a 
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready 
to commit it. 
(R. 143, Addendum C). The instruction recited Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) almost 
word for word, differing only in its substitution of the words "defendant" for "actor" in 
the first sentence, "law enforcement officer" for "peace officer" in the second sentence, 
and in the omission of the sentence "[c]onduct merely affording a person an opportunity 
to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment." Those minor changes did not 
materially alter or detract from the statute's meaning. 
In Taylor, 599 P.2d at 499, the Utah Supreme Court observed that the entrapment 
statute "by its express terms incorporates the objective standard." The court rejected the 
subjective test for entrapment previously employed. The subjective test required two 
inquiries: "(1) whether there was an inducement on the part of the government, and (2) if 
so, whether the defendant showed any predisposition to commit the offense." Id at 499-
500. The objective test adopted in Taylor "shifts attention from the record and 
predisposition of the particular defendant to the conduct of the police and the likelihood, 
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objectively considered, that it would entrap only those ready and willing to commit 
crime.' Therefore, only police conduct that 'entraps' those ready and willing to commit 
the crime is acceptable." State v. Cripps, 692 P.2d 747, 750 (Utah 1984). 
Because the words of the statute reflect the objective standard, the statute itself is 
an appropriate jury instruction. The Utah Supreme Court "has approved giving the 
statutory definition of entrapment to the jury," as has this Court. Cripps, 692 P.2d at 748 
(citing State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah 1980); see also State v. Squire, 888 P.2d 
1102, 1104 (Utah App. 1994). In Squire, this Court held that a trial court did not err in 
refusing to give a defendant's proposed jury instruction on entrapment where the 
instruction given followed the statutory language. "The language of the instruction given 
by the trial court to the jury directly tracks the statute establishing the entrapment defense. 
. . . Defendant cannot claim that he was prejudiced by a jury instruction that tracks the 
very statutory language under which he asserted his defense." Id; see also State v. 
Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah App. 1990) (no error in refusing defendant's requested 
instruction where instructions given to the jury "directly parallel the statutory language 
and correctly instruct on the applicable law"). The instruction given here tracked the 
statute, focusing on the activities of law enforcement agents and those acting in at the 
direction of, or in cooperation with, law enforcement agents. Thus, the instruction 
adequately instructed the jury on the appropriate objective standard. 
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Although defendant argues that his proposed instruction more fully explained the 
law of entrapment, this Court has held that "[i]t is within the trial court's discretion . . . to 
select between two accurate but different jury instructions Our inquiry therefore must 
center on the jury instruction actually used and determine whether it accurately states the 
law. So long as the jury instruction used was accurate, it was not error for the trial court 
to refuse a different instruction that was also accurate." State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 586, 
590 (Utah App. 1993). Although a defendant is "entitled to an instruction on his or her 
theory of the case, he is not entitled to multiple instructions setting forth the same 
theory." State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989). Since the instruction given was 
accurate, there was no error in giving it, and this Court need not consider the propriety of 
defendant's proposed instruction. Gallegos, 849 P.2d at 590. 
Defendant's proposed jury instruction quoted from Taylor examples of 
government conduct that, depending on the circumstances, might constitute entrapment 
(R. 246, Addendum C).7 Defendant claims that these examples are "indispensable to any 
defendant's proposed instruction included the following: 
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, 
pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money, 
are examples, depending on an evaluation of the circumstances in each 
case, of what might constitute prohibited police conduct. In evaluating the 
course of conduct between the government representative and the 
defendant, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction 
between the agent and the defendant, and the response to the inducements 
of the agent, are all to be considered in judging what the effect of the 
governmental agent's conduct would be on a normal [in Taylor, "average"] 
person. 
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meaningful review and analysis of the issue of entrapment...." Appellant's Brief at 27. 
He asserts that the failure to provide the jury with the examples left the jury unable to 
fully understand the defense of entrapment. Id. 
However, the list of examples in Taylor is not exhaustive, nor is each example 
universally present. Instead, as Taylor and its progeny recognize, a variety of factors and 
circumstances may or may not constitute entrapment. See, e.g.. State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 
497 (Utah 1989) (alleged friendship did not constitute entrapment); State v. Udell, 728 
P.2d 131 (Utah 1986) (no entrapment where defendant's conduct showed he stood ready 
to commit offense); State v. Sprague. 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984 (persistent requests for 
drugs constituted entrapment); ) State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980)(same); 
State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1995) (friendship alone did not create 
entrapment). Since the existence of entrapment depends upon the particular 
circumstances of each case, the trial court was not required to provide hypothetical 
examples of entrapment. Indeed, a requirement that the trial court instruct the jury on 
hypothetical entrapment scenarios that may not be relevant to the case at hand could 
create confusion in jurors' minds. 
Here, once the trial court properly instructed the jury on the legal standard, defense 
Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503. Since Taylor, the Utah Supreme Court has held that Taylor's 
reference to an "average person" was dicta and, due to its potential for obscuring the 
proper legal standard, "should not be elevated to law by being recited in a jury 
instruction." Cripps, 692 P.2d at 750. Defendant's proposed instruction referring to "a 
normal person" was arguably problematic under Cripps. 
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counsel was free to argue from the evidence the specific facts supporting the defense of 
entrapment. During closing argument, defense counsel discussed the objective standard 
at some length: 
[The entrapment statute] says, "does [the government agent] induce the 
commission of an offense? The language of that statute directly focuses on 
the verb there, "did that person induce the commission of an offense." 
What did that person do in order to induce the commission of an offense? 
Entrapment says, "did they induce the commission of an offense?" 
And I think the evidence shows that that's what has occurred here, is Edie 
Randle used what she knew about Patrick Stanley in order to get him to get 
her some methamphetamine. And he went to Salt Lake and he did.... I 
want you to think about everything you have heard in the last two days in 
light of that statute. Did she induce the commission of this offense? And if 
she induced it, then he didn't do it knowingly and intentionally.... In 
looking at [the jury instruction] as a whole, talking about the inducement 
and whether or not that happened, and what that means, it's important to 
couple that with the remaining part of that, that it has to be done by methods 
creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. 
(R. 213 at 20-21, 24-25). In addition to explaining the objective standard, defense 
counsel thoroughly described the evidence supporting defendant's entrapment defense (R. 
213 at 19-38, Addendum E). In light of defense counsel's argument setting forth the 
specific facts of this case supporting entrapment, defendant's proposed jury instruction 
listing hypothetical examples of entrapment would have been superfluous. The jury was 
fully informed of both the applicable law and defendant's factual theory of the case. 
No Reasonable Likelihood of a Different Outcome. Defendant maintains that if 
the trial court had instructed the jury as he proposed, there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the jury would not have convicted him.. Appellant's Brief at 30. That contention 
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assumes that the jury believed defendant's version of the events.8 It is well established 
that it is the prerogative of the trier of fact to judge the credibility of witnesses and to 
believe the testimony of one witness over another. State v. Udell 728 P.2d 131, 132 
(Utah 1986) (jury was free to disbelieve defendant's controverted testimony that 
confidential informant entrapped him into supplying marijuana). "[Determinations of 
witness credibility are left to the jury. The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part 
of any witness's testimony." State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993) (citing 
State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902, 904-05 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 
1990)). 
Although defendant denied that he had sold drugs to Edie in the past and claimed 
that he and Edie enjoyed a friendship independent of any drug dealings, Edie contradicted 
his testimony, consistently maintaining that she knew defendant primarily as a drug 
contact (R. 212 at 23, 42). Edie disputed defendant's statements at trial that she exhibited 
fear for her safety (R. 212 at 27). Furthermore, Mangum stated that he did not observe 
8In fact, it is unlikely that the jury found defendant credible. On cross 
examination, defendant could not remember the last names of persons he had telephoned 
(from "five or six" pay phones) in his search for drugs (R. 212 at 123, Addendum B). He 
was vague about what telephone numbers he called and how he came to obtain those 
phone numbers (id.). He further claimed that "Joe Martinez," the distant acquaintance 
from whom he eventually obtained the drugs allowed him to walk away with $600 worth 
of methamphetamine without paying anything for it, even though "Joe" had not seen 
defendant in four or five years (R. 212 at 121). Finally, defendant made the dubious 
claim that he blew the methamphetamine powder out of the plastic case, rather than 
inhaling it as Officer Mangum observed (R. 212 at 104). 
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anything improper in Edie's conduct (R. 212 at 196). The jury obviously chose to believe 
the testimony of Mangum and Edie over defendant's claims. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY THAT A PRIOR CONVICTION FOR DRUG POSSESSION 
WAS AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF POSSESSION OR USE 
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE BECAUSE THE PRIOR 
CONVICTION WAS ALREADY PROPERLY BEFORE THE JURY 
Jury Instruction no. 5 provided that an element of possession or use of a controlled 
substance as it was charged in the amended information was that defendant "had 
previously been convicted of possession of a controlled substance" (R. 149, Addendum 
F). Defendant claims that this Court's decision in State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724 (Utah 
App. 1996) established that a prior conviction does not change the nature of the offense, 
but merely enhances the penalty to be imposed. Appellant's Brief at 32. Therefore, 
defendant asserts, it was plain error for the trial court to instruct the jury that a prior 
conviction was an element of the charged offense. Appellant's Brief at 31-34. 
Alternatively, defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to 
the instruction. Appellant's Brief at 34-37. 
Defendant acknowledges that his claim was not preserved below, but maintains 
that this Court may nevertheless address it as plain error under rule 19(c), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure ("to avoid manifest injustice"). Appellant's Brief at 31. Plain error 
requires that (1) an error exist, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, 
and (3) but for the error, there would be "a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
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outcome" for defendant, or, stated another way, the error undermines confidence in the 
outcome of the proceedings. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 588 (Utah App. 1995). If any one of these elements is missing, 
there is no plain error. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Here, defendant has not shown error. 
Furthermore, he cannot show prejudice because his prior convictions were already 
properly before jury. 
A. No Error, Obvious or Otherwise, Occurred. 
Although defendant relies on Portillo, that case is distinguishable. In Portillo, the 
defendant was charged with three counts of distributing or arranging to distribute 
marijuana under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-l(a), a third-degree felony. Portillo, 914 P.2d 
at 726. Utah Code Ann. § 58-8-l(b)(ii) provided, as it does now, that "upon a second or 
subsequent conviction" for distributing or arranging to distribute, a defendant could be 
punished for a second-degree felony. Count I was charged as a third-degree felony, and 
because they were viewed as second or subsequent convictions, counts II and III were 
charged as second-degree felonies. Portillo, 914 P.2d at 725. On counts II and III, the 
jury was instructed that an element of the offense charged was that" the distribution was 
a second or subsequent violation occurring after a previous violation of the same statute." 
Id. (emphasis added). Defendant challenged his convictions on the grounds that the jury 
instruction incorrectly stated the law because it referred to "violation" rather than, in the 
statute's parlance, "conviction." Portillo, Appellant's Brief at 22-23, Case No. 940387-
CA. 
23 
This Court reversed Portillo's conviction, holding that "the plain language of this 
statute reveals this error was obvious." Portillo, 914 P.2d at 726. The holding was based 
on the fact that the jury instruction stated that a prior "violation" was an element of the 
offense, rather than a prior "conviction" as the statute specified. Thus, the finding of 
error in Portillo was based on a semantic variance from the statutory language, not on 
whether a prior conviction constituted an element of the crime. The error deemed 
obvious in Portillo is not at issue here. 
Even if the instruction were error, it could not have been obvious to the trial court. 
Defendant cites no cases other than Portillo in support of his contention that the trial court 
erred. Since Portillo is readily distinguishable, the "error" was not obvious to the trial 
court. A plain error claim must be evaluated under "controlling authority at the time of 
the trial." State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 1336, 1341 (Utah App. 1990): see also State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989); State v. Harrison, 
805 P.2d 769, 779 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). This Court has 
refused to hold that plain error occurred where no settled case law controls. State v. 
Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 805 (Utah App.), cert, denied 986 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998); State v. 
Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Utah courts have repeatedly held that a 
trial court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial 
court."). 
In sum, no error, plain or otherwise, occurred. 
24 
B. Any Arguable Error was Harmless, 
Defendant claims Jury Instruction #5 prejudiced him because it "removed the 
attention of the jurors from the issue of entrapment and the conduct of Mangum and 
[Edie] Randall and focused it squarely on Stanley's history." Appellant's Brief at 33. He 
asserts that the trial court should have bifurcated the evidence of his prior conviction until 
after he had been convicted of the current charge. Appellant's Brief at 32-33. Defendant 
contends that instructing the jury regarding defendant's prior conviction caused the jury 
to be predisposed to convict him. Id. 
Assuming arguendo that the trial court plainly erred in instructing the jury that a 
prior conviction was an element of possession or use of methamphetamine, the "error" 
was clearly harmless.9 Evidence of defendant's prior conviction was already legitimately 
put before the jury during defendant's testimony. Defendant candidly acknowledged his 
9Portillo, the case on which defendant relies, recognized that even if a jury 
instruction incorrectly states the law, the error does not require reversal of a conviction 
unless the error is harmful. Portillo, 914 P.2d at 726. In that case, the Court observed 
that "because the instructions required the jury to find more elements than set forth in the 
statute before it could convict defendant,... in an abstract sense, the instruction was 
more helpful than harmful to defendant." Id, However, in that case, the Court found that 
the error was prejudicial to Portillo. During its lengthy deliberations, the jury submitted a 
written query to the trial judge, which read: "The 3rd charge, instruction # 5, element # 7 
refers to this charge as a subsequent violation. If count one and count two are 'not guilty' 
can a guilty verdict be given for count 3 [?]" Id. The court responded "no," and almost 
immediately thereafter the jury returned with a guilty verdict on all three counts. Id. 
Portillo asserted that the jury's question, coupled with the facts that (1) the evidence 
supporting counts I and II was similar and much less convincing than the evidence 
supporting count III, and (2) the verdict was rendered almost immediately after the 
question was answered, demonstrated that the jury was contemplating a not guilty verdict 
as to counts I and II. Id. Based on the unique facts of that case, the Court agreed. Id. 
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past felony convictions and the details of those convictions on direct examination (R. 212 
at 110-11). That evidence was admissible under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(6) (1999), 
which provides that "in a trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past 
convictions for felonies." The evidence was also admissible to rebut defendant's 
testimony that he did not know where or how to purchase methamphetamine. 
Significantly, defendant does not challenge the admissibility of that evidence. 
It is unlikely that the jury instruction focused the jurors' attention on the 
convictions any more than defendant's testimony did. Because defendant's convictions 
were properly before the jury, the trial court's instruction could not have affected the 
outcome.10 
C. Defendant Was Not Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel, 
Defendant alternatively seeks review of instruction no. 5 by asserting that his trial 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Appellant's Brief at 34-37. 
"To prevail [on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel], a defendant must 
show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994\ cert, denied 513 U.S. 966; (quoting Strickland v. 
10Defendant urges this Court to require bifurcated proceedings in drug cases where 
the penalty is enhanced for prior convictions. Appellant's Brief at 32-33. However, 
bifurcation would not have been appropriate in this case since defendant asserted an 
entrapment defense. Evidence of his prior convictions would still have reached the jury. 
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 
1995). Both deficient performance and prejudice must be present to demonstrate 
ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 
874 (Utah 1993). 
"[A] defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel has the difficult burden 
of showing actual unreasonable representation and actual prejudice." State v. Tyler, 850 
P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 1993). "[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance." State v. 
Tavlor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997), cert, denied Taylor v. Utah, 119 S.Ct. 89 (1998) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 
"If a rational basis for counsel's performance can be articulated [this Court] will 
assume counsel acted competently." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 
1993). Thus, "an ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable 
legitimate tactics or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." Id. Defense 
counsel's decision to ask defendant about his convictions on direct exam was sound trial 
strategy. Since the evidence would have been admissible anyway, defense counsel likely 
believed that by introducing it herself, she could control the context in which it was 
presented and minimize its potential for prejudice. The testimony enhanced defendant's 
credibility because it made defendant appear straightforward, honest, and nonevasive. 
Once the evidence was before the jury, counsel had no reason to object to the instruction. 
Thus, her performance was not deficient. 
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"If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 
sufficient prejudice,... that course should be followed." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 670; see 
also State v. Arguelles. 921 P.2d439, 441 (Utah 1996); Parsons. 871 P.2d at 523. As 
explained above, defendant was not prejudiced by the instruction because the information 
of his prior convictions was already properly before the jury. 
Defendant can show neither deficient performance nor prejudice. Therefore, his 
ineffective assistance claim fails. 
POINT III 
OFFICER TERRY'S TESTIMONY THAT THE MOTEL 
WAS WITHIN A DRUG-FREE ZONE WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to allow the jury to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenses occurred within a drug-free zone. 
Appellant's Brief at 38. 
An appellate court reverses a jury conviction for insufficient evidence "only when 
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); 
see also State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994); State v. Harlev, 982 P.2d 1145, 
1147 (Utah App. 1999). 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a) (1998) provides that person is guilty of a first-
degree felony if the person possesses, uses or distributes drugs within 1,000 feet of a 
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school, park, recreation center, stadium, playhouse, public parking lot, or other specified 
location. Whether a drug offense is committed within a drug-free zone is an element that 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the same trier of fact who decides the 
predicate offense. State v. Powasniak, 918 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah App. 1996). 
Officer Terry testified that he had represented Lehi City on the Narcotics 
Enforcement Task Force for two years (R. 211 at 282). He stated that he "had cases in 
the past years where we've had an overview map done of that area, of the motel itself. 
And it gives you - when they do that, it's a topographical map, and it just shows you 
where it sits. And the playland for McDonald's sits in there as well as, you know, the 
high school ball field" (R. 211 at 294). The topographical map showed the motel as the 
center of a circle with a radius of 1,000 feet, and was prepared using aerial surveillance 
(id.. R. 212 at 10). Furthermore, Officer Terry testified that he had personally measured 
the distance of Lehi city blocks, and that there are between 400 and 600 feet in a block 
(id.). He said the McDonald's playland was less than "a block and a half away," or 630 
feet. (R. 211 at 294). The officer also said that "[t]here's a high school right across the 
street, a ball field right across the street from there, and it is within a thousand feet of the 
motel" (id). 
No .evidence was adduced at trial to counter the officer's definite statements that 
the motel was within 1,000 feet of the McDonald's playland, the high school, and the ball 
field. Defendant has cited no authority for the proposition that any evidence beyond the 
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officer's testimony was required. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
the evidence was sufficient. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's convictions. 
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Addendum A 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-2-303. Entrapment. 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to 
obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a 
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise 
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to 
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or 
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the 
prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a person 
other than the person perpetrating the entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the actor 
denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on 
the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the 
defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be 
made at least ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may 
permit a later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it shall 
dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was 
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at 
trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be 
appealable by the state. 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of entrapment is 
an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted except that in a 
trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for 
felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on entrapment 
may be used to impeach his testimony at trial. 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A— Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a 
first decree felony punishable bv imDrisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2Xa)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(aXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2Xb)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXii) or (2XaXiii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4Xa)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(yiii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(aXi) through (viii); or — — 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
Addendum B 
[ 1] drugs, is that right? 
[2] A I have heard her say that, yes. 
[ 3] Q Getting $350 from someone is not something 
[ 4] that you have to do face to face, is it? 
[ 5] A Neither -
[ 6] Q That's a simple question. 
[ 7] A Neither is loaning them $350. 
[ 8] Q Getting $350 isn't something that you have to 
[ 9] do face to face, though, is it? 
[10] A No. It's not something you'd have to do face 
[11] to face, no. 
[12] Q Okay. Getting the $350 could have been 
[13] accomplished just by asking her to drop it in the 
[14] mail, couldn't it have? 
[15] A It very well probably could have, yes. 
[16] Q You probably would have had it the next day 
[17] or the day after, isn't that right? 
[18] A I don't know. I would imagine, yes. If 
[19] there were no delays in the mail. 
[20] Q You could have received it by mail, is that 
[21] right? 
[22] A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
[23] Q When you went to Spanish Fork to collect this 
[24] money, then you were going to have to travel back to 
[25] Salt Lake, weren't you? 
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[ 1] A Yes. 
[ 2] Q And that was for to you bring methamphetamine 
[ 3] to them, is that right? 
[4] A At that point? 
[ 5] Q Now, from the time that you left Spanish Pork 
[ 6] until you arrived in Lehi, there wasn't anyone else 
[ 7] with you, was there? 
[ 8] A No. 
[9] Q Officer Mangum wasn't there, was he? 
[10] A No. 
[11] Q Edee wasn't with you? 
[12] A No. 
[13] Q Wasn't anyone there giving you any kind of 
[14] pressure whatsoever to go through with this, isn't 
[15] mat right? 
[16] A Officer Mangum had Edee with him at that 
[17] point. I took it as hostage. 
[18] Q Neither one of those individuals were with 
[19] you, were they? 
[20] A No. 
[21] Q There was nothing that made you go back to 
[22] that Lehi motel room, was there? 
[23] A Yes. The safety of my friend. 
[24] Q There wasn't anyone with you. No one had a 
[25] gun to your head or anything Kke that that made you 
[ 1] A Yes, ma'am. 
[2] Q And they were going to have to travel back to 
[ 3] wherever they were from, is that right? 
[4] A I would imagine. 
[5] Q So we're talking about, what, maybe four 
[ 6\ hours travel time on their part, is that right? 
[7] A I have no idea. 
[8] Q A couple of hours travel time on your part? 
[9] A An hour and a half. 
[10] Q And this was at 9 o'clock at night, right? 
[11] A Yes. It was 8 o'clock when I left. 
[12] Q What was 8 o'clock? 
[13] A It was 8 o'clock when I left Salt Lake. 
[14] Q You went to that motel room in Lehi with the 
[15] understanding that you would be meeting there alone 
[16] with Officer Mangum and with Edee, didn't you? 
[17] A I wasn't even sure. 
[18] Q Did you expect other people to be there? 
[19] A I didn't even expect Officer Mangum - I 
[20] didn't even know if he would still be there. I 
[21] don't - I don't know what I expected. I didn't know 
[22] what to expect. 
[23] Q Your agreement was that you were to meet the 
[24] two of them in Lehi after they paged you at that motel 
[25] room, isn't that right? 
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[ 1] go back to that motel room, isn't that right? 
[ 2] A They had a gun to Edee's head as far as I 
[ 3] knew. 
[4] Q Listen to my question. No one was with you, 
[ 5] you weren't kidnapped and taken back there -
[ 6] MS. NEIDER: Judge, counsel is badgering the 
[ 7] witness. She asked -
[ 8] THE COURT: No. He hasn't responded to the 
[ 9] question. If he'll listen closely to the question and 
[10] respond only to the question. 
[11] THE WITNESS: Okay. What was the question? 
[12] Q (By Ms. Ragan) No one dragged you back to 
[13] that motel room, did they? 
[14] A No. 
[15] O No one in Salt Lake was there and took you 
[16] and forcibly made you go get that methamphetamine, did 
[17] they? 
[18] A No. 
[19] Q How much money did you have to give the 
[20] individual with the black box for the meth? 
[21] A Zero. 
[22] Q So this individual that's giving you, what, 
[23] $600 and apparently you don't know them very well, is 
[24] that right? Do you know this person? 
[25] A Yes. 
1 l "J 
[2] 
[3] 
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Somebody that I know. 
Who is it? 
From past experiences. 
What is their name? 
Joe. 
Joe what, Mr. Stanley? 
Joe Martinez. 
Where does Mr. Martinez live? 
I don't know. 
How did you contact him? 
By phone. 
Where did you meet him? 
I have known him from four or five years ago. 
Okay. Had you seen him in that intervening 
No. 
So just based on your phone call, you hadn't 
seen him for four or five years, he was willing to 
just hand over to you methamphetamine in the amount of 

































And he didn't require you to give him any 
r or anything else for that? 







How did you come up with that meeting place? 
At his suggestion. 
Where did you make the phone calls from? 
A pay phone. 
Where was it located? 
Actually it was about five or six of them. 
Do you want all the addresses? 
Q Well, five or six. So five or six different 




Is that right? And were those to different 






And how did you locate those phone numbers? 
Well, I located one or two out of the phone 
And then just asked different people for 







Okay. Who else did you call? 
Who else did I call? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
I called somebody named Jay son. 
How did you know him? 
From my tree service. I had just met him. I 
was on a job and he lived down the street or 
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Q And in the time that you went from Spanish 1 
Fork and then showed up in Lehi, you were able to then 
somehow find these people and find 13 and half grams, 
is that right? That all took place in that time span, 
is that right? 
A What took place, three or four hours? 
Q From the time you left Spanish Fork and went 
to Lehi? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. You did not tell anyone that you had 
to go back to your house, is that your testimony, to 
get the methamphetamine? 
A Right. 
Q You didn't tell anyone that you went back 
there and that your friends or whatever who were there 
had sold part of it? 
A No. 
Q So if anyone is saying that, that just didn't 
happen? 
A Right. 
Q How — how did you contact Mr. Martinez? 
A Telephone. 
Q And where did you meet with him? 
A I believe it was Second East and 73rd South 



























Q Okay. What's his last name? 
A I don't know. 
Q And yet you felt like he might be someone 
that could get you some methamphetamine, is that 
right? 
A I was taking a shot in the dark. 
Q Who else did you call? 
A I called a guy named Bill in West Valley. 
Q What is Bill's last name? 
A I don't know. 
Q Okay. Who else? 
A There was a couple people that weren't home. 
Q Okay. Who were they? 
A There's another guy named Bill. 
Q What was his last name? 
A I don't know. These are just people. These 
are not personal friends. So.... 
Q Okay. Who else? 
A I don't - and Mark. 
Q What's his last name? 
A I don't know. 
Q You don't know his either? Mr. Stanley, how 
did you look these people's number up in the phone 




















































r\ wcu, t tooKca we nisi one up — 1 
Q Now, you said you called a couple of these 
people from the phone book? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q How did you look them up if you didn't know 
their last name, sir? 
A Well, Mark, I looked up under Andy's Garage, 
because that's where he worked. 
Q So you knew him well enough to know where he 
worked? 
A Right. 
Q But you don't know his last name? 
A No. 
Q He worked at Andy's Garage? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And Andy's Garage was open at 10 o'clock at 
night? 
A No. That was one of the people that I 
couldn't get ahold of. 
Q Okay. Go ahead. 
A Go ahead and what? 
Q How did you reach these other people if you 
didn't know their last names? Or did you have their 
numbers? 
A Like I said, some of them I asked from other 
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now, or do you want to continue for about five 
minutes, counsel, and we'll take the noon break? 
What's your desire? 
MS. RAGAN: Judge, now is line. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ladies and gentlemen, in 
light of that, let's take our noon break. I will 
caution you not to discuss the case with anyone. 
Don't attempt to learn anything about this case 
outside this courtroom setting. If you've taken notes 
don't show them to anyone. And avoid any type of 
media attention as it relates to the case. If we 
could come back at five to 1, I'd like to start 
directly at 1 o'clock. 
Let's look at the - just for the benefit of 
the jury in timing this afternoon, how many additional 
witnesses does the State have, or is this the last 
witness? 
MS. NBIDER: You mean the defense, Judge? 
THE COURT: Yeah, defense. Excuse me. 
MS. NEIDER: Possibility of two. I would 
need to confirm whether or not they are here. 
THE COURT: Okay. You can confirm that 
during the noon hour. And would the State anticipate 
rebuttal witnesses? 



























Q Uh-huh (affirmative). 1 
A I think - Joe's number. 1 
Q Okay. Who did you call first? 1 
A Who did I call first? I think Bill. 
Q Okay. That's the West Valley Bill or the 1 
other one? 1 
A Okay. 1 
Q And you were able to reach him? 1 
A And I had his number. 1 
Q You had his number? 1 
A And he runs Bill's Tree Service. 1 
Q Do you have that number written down or had 1 
it memorized or how did you — 1 
A I believe I had it in my wallet. And had his 1 
card, I believe, Bill's Tree Service. 1 
Q And what happened from Bill? Then who did 
you call? 
A I asked him for the other Bill's number. 
Q And that's one you tried and couldn't reach, 
is that right? 
A Right. 
Q All right. Then who? 
A I can't recall. 
THE COURT: Do we wish to take the noon break 


























three. They will all be brief, though. 
THE COURT: Okay. Very well. Let's take our 
noon break now. Thank you very much. 
(Lunch recess taken.) 
Addendum C 
INSTRUCTION NO. M 
It is a defense that the defendant was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence 
of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense 
would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. 
Addendum D 
£, INSTRUCTION NO. ^ll^OO^p It is a defense that the defendant was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the 
commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be 
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. 
The test to determine an unlawful entrapment is whether a law enforcement official or an 
agent, in order to obtain evidence of the commission of an offense, induced the defendant to commit 
such an offense whiciot&uld-be-ef^^ 
mcfeiy given the opportunity to comnrirthe-effenser-
/
' l Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close 
personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money, are examples, depending on an evaluation 
of the circumstances in each case of what might constitute prohibited police conduct. In evaluating 
the course of conduct between the government representative and the defendant, the transactions 
leading up to the offense, the interaction between the agent and the defendant, and the response to the 
inducements of the agent are all to be considered in judging what the effect of the governmental 
agent's conduct would be on a normal person;-
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Addendum E 
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I [ 1] The defendant and this is the case with most 
[ 2] people who are involved in drugs, was greedy. Generally 
[ 3] people involved in this type of thing use 
[ 4] methamphetamine, and we know in this case he was. In 
[ 5] fact he was so anxious, he did it immediately as soon as 
[ 6 ] he had the opportunity. 
[ 7] Most people in that situation need money to 
[ 8] support their habit and that leads them into the 
[ 9] distribution of the methamphetamine, and that's exactly 
[10] what we have in this situation. He was set up by 
| [11] someone that he knew. And he's upset about that He's 
[12] upset that he got caught But that's all there is to 
[13] it He got caught and committed a crime and needs to 
I [14] held responsible for that. He did not have to do the 
[15] deal. He had more than ample opportunity to call it 
[16] off He says that Edie was afraid of this guy and 
[17] expressed that to him in all of these types of things. 
[18] So you heard Edie testify. You have to evaluate for 
[19] yourself if he's telling the truth about this. Edie has 
[20] no reason to come in here and lie, in fact she has even/ 
[21] reason, maybe to try to support the defendant's point of 
[22] view at this point, or whatever, because as you might 
| [23] guess, she's probably not real fond of police officers. 
[24] She's had her runs-in with them, too. So her 
i [25] testimony ~ she has no reason not to come in here and 
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[ 1] the state. When we opened or started, I told you a 
[ 2] story about perspective, about the guy who was walking 
[ 3] down the trail, thought he saw a bear, wasn't a bear, he 
| 4] saw a tree; that perspective can be drastically 
I 5 J different depending upon where you're standing in 
[ 6] reviewing the facts of a situation, and I think that's 
[ 7] essential in this case, because as the state has stated 
[ 8] and as Ms. Ragan has argued in her closing arguments, 
[ 9] there are a lot of things that look really bad to 
[10] Patrick Stanley. And if you step far enough away, you 
[11] can see why the state wants to make this case. And why 
(12] they're arguing that he is guilty of distribution, and 
[131 possession or use of methamphetamine. And that's not 
[ 14] hard to see the State's perspective from there. 
[15] But what is important is we don't stop there, 
[16] and we don't just take their word for it but analyze 
[17] the facts and look at the evidence, and you do that now 
[18] from Patrick Stanley's perspective, and you do that 
[19] based upon what he knew, what he saw, what he was told, 
and how he felt. Because that's what matters. And 
[21] that's because the crimes that they have charged 
[22] require, as Ms. Ragan has indicated to you, and as she 
[23] read from the instructions, both instruction number 4 
[24] and number 5, the elements of the offense here, and the 
[25] elements of both of those crimes, require that he 
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[ 1 ] tell you what she remembers happened. She admitted some 
| [ 2] things that were very unfavorable to her. She mentioned 
| [ 3] to you she has been involved in drugs, purchased drugs 
I [ 4 ] and those types of things. She has no reason to lie 
[ 5] about that. 
I [ 6] I think that's basically all that I want to 
I [ 7] bring to your attention at this point in time. As the 
[ 8] court has told you. I will have an opportunity to 
I [ 9] address you again. That's because the state has the 
' [10] burden. But as I said, in the beginning in my opening 
| [11] statement the state is asking you to find him guilty of 
| [12] both of those crimes, both the distributing 
| [13] methamphetamine and the possession or use of 
| [14] methamphetamine and we'll ask you to do what you've been 
j [15] asked to do, take on this responsibility and follow the 
I [16] court's instructions in that regard. Thank you. 
[17] THE COURT: Thank you, counselor. 
| [18] Ms. Neider, you may proceed. 
| [19] MS. NEIDER: Thank you. Judge. 
| [20] Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. It's 
| [21] been along time and we appreciate your patience and 
| [22] understanding and being here and just your attendance. 
| [23] And we appreciate what you're going to do next most and 
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[ 1] knowingly, and intentionally has committed these crimes. 
[ 2 ] If he was entrapped by the state's confidential 
[ 3] informant then they can't say that he was acting 
[ 4] knowingly and intentionally. We can't have both of 
[ 5] those. We can't say he was entrapped and yet it was of 
[ 6] his own free will and intended to do it. And that's why 
[ 7 ] we have argued and talked about entrapment, because 
[ 8] Patrick Stanley on those occasions didn't act knowingly 
[ 9] and intentionally. And those two, those two words are 
[10] in the elements of both crimes, and are essential to the 
[11] crimes. 
[12] This isn't a balancing test and it isn't 
[13] something that says, well, I think maybe he did eight of 
[14] the 9 of those things or even if he did 5 of the 9 of 
[15] the elements. He has to do every single one of them. 
[16] He has to have acted knowingly and intentionally, and if 
[17] he didn't do that then he's not guilt And he can't be 
[18] found guilty of the crimes that the state has accused 
[19] him of 
[20] The entrapment language the Judge read to 
[21] you, and I know you don't have that in front of you yet 
[22] bill you wli„ I want to focus on that for a minute and 
[23] tell you what to expect And when you get in the jury 
F241 room I want to you take it out and read rt and analyze 
1 rayv 
[ 1 ] 
I [2] 
I [3] 
[ 4 ] 
[ 5 ] 
I [6] 
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Patrick Stanley was entrapped in this case. The statute 
says, "entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer 
or person directed by or acting in cooperation with the 
officer - " that's the first thing, was Edie Handle. 
She wasn't a law enforcement officer but was she a 
person directed by or acting in cooperation with an 
officer? Clearly she was that She had called, and she 
had worked - she had called Detective Mangum. She had 
worked with other officers before. She set up the buy. 
she went with them, she was in there - she was with 
them constantly. They were watching her and they were 
both concerned for her safety and they wanted to make 
sure things went well. She was with them at all times 
that Patrick Stanley was present. He never dealt 
directly with the officer without her there. She was 
working in cooperation with the officers. That means 
that the entrapment statute applies. 
The next part of that says, "does that person 
induce the commission of an offense? The language of 
that statute directly focuses on the verb there, "did 
that person induce the commission of an offense?" What 
did that person do in order is to induce the commission 
of an offense? Now. we have heard several times that 
nobody held a gun to Patrick Stanley's head. We have i 
heard that nobody went with him to Salt Lake to get it, 
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that nobody forced him to do anything. How many times 
have we heard that? Nobody forced him to do anything. 
That's not what entrapment says. Entrapment says, "did 
they induce the commission of an offense?" And I think 
the evidence shows that that's what has occurred here. 
is Edie Randle used what she knew about Patrick Stanley 
in order to get him to get her some methamphetamine. 
And he went to Salt Lake, and he did. And I want to 
talk about some of the other evidence, but I want you to 
think about everything you have heard in the last two 
days in light of that statute. Did she induce the 
commission of this offense? And if she induced it then 
he didn't do it knowingly and intentionally. 
We talked earlier about the standards that 
law enforcement have to live up to. And what the law 
enforcement officers did in this case, is relevant. 
Detective Mangum testified that he had heard of Edie 
Randle. but he didn't know her personally, and he had 
heard it over a period of time, he wasn't sure how long, 
that she had organized or arranged, participated in. 
somewhere in the neighborhood of 170 controlled buys for 
drugs of some sort He also testified that it was 
common for him to participate in about 15 buys a month. 
And that was a busy month for him. So he knew going, in 
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called him, that was in custody: that was in jail, that 
had - and he was dealing with somebody who was a very 
seasoned confidential informant and that the other 
officers had worked with her, and another officer asked 
him to go, and he did that. That's all he did, and 
that's all he knew. 
He testified that he didn't ask her any 
questions about what she understood, necessarily of what 
her responsibilities were. He didn't go into the law of 
entrapment with her, because he thought that had been 
done. But he didn't check the file to see if it had 
been done or which officer had done it or how long ago 
they had done it He made a lot of assumptions just due 
to the fact she said I can set up a buy. 
So he - it's also important to look at what 
he told us he had been trained to do. He had been 
trained to check out any information given for him by a 
confidential informant. He said that's the first thing 
they tell them at some of those schools they go to, is 
check out and check, and check their information. And 
he didn't do that in any of these situations. 
He also said the other things they teach 
them, is tell them about the law and watch out for their 
safety. He didn't tell her about the law, but I think 
that he watched out for her safety. And he was with 
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her, or had another officer with her to make sure that 
she was going to be safe, except for those few times she 
was conversing with Patrick Stanley. 
Now, let's talk about Edie Randle. She was 
in custody- She had been picked up for possession of 
marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia. Now those 
aren't serious charges. As one of the witnesses 
testified, that a lot of times one can expect to be 
released on those kind of charges relatively quickly, 
either by the sheriff or perhaps by a judge. But the 
bottom line is, Edie Randle didn't know when she was 
going to be released either by the sheriffs department 
or the judge. She was in custody. Can you think of 
anyplace scarier to be if you have set up and organized 
170 organized controlled buys? It didn't matter if she 
had been ticketed for speeding or was in custody for jay 
walking. It didn't matter what she was facing. What 
mattered is she was in custody and she wanted out of 
custody and that was her main concern, and she wanted to 
get out and she was willing to do anything to get out 
of custody. And what she did at this point was set up 
Patrick Stanley. And she knew she could do that. And 
she knew that she could induce him or coerce him into 
helping her get methamphetamine. 
1 <•*'» ***lts Akn i r f « K A t r a i n i n n e h a Kar l 
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received prior to that She said that she had been told 
on two or three occasions when she had gone out with 
officers, to be careful and to watch her back, and if 
she got in too keep, to get out 1 asked her if she had 
ever been told what the law of entrapment was. She said 
no, she couldn't explain it to us. and in fact she said 
she had never been told there were boundaries she 
couldn't go past in getting someone to sell her 
methamphetamine. That is so far past what can actually 
happen because the statute says right there that if they 
induce the commission of a crime - she's never been 
told that She's never been told - if she induces the 
commission of a crime, it's not a valid controlled buy. 
She can't charge somebody or somebody can't be convicted 
of tihat She had no idea what it was she was doing. 
THE COURT: Counsel, will you both approach 
thn bench? 
(Bench conference held) 
MS. NEIDER: Let me finish telling you what 
the rest of the entrapment instruction says. 
'Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or 
person directed by or acting in cooperation with the 
officer - ' we've read - 'that induces the commission 
of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the 
commission for prosecution, by methods creating a 
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substantial risk that the offense would be committed by 
one not otherwise ready to commit i t ' 
in looking at that in a whole, talking about 
the inducement and whether or not that happened, and 
what that means, it's important to couple that with the 
remaining part of that that it has to be done by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the offense 
would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit 
it And those do have to be coupled together. 
And it's important to focus on the entire 
statute, and you'll have the entire statute when you get 
back there. 1 don't want to mislead It takes more 
than an offer, obviously - 1 mean it takes more than 
that to entrap somebody. And if by inducing them to 
commit the offense by methods creating a substantial 
risk that the offense would be committed by mm not 
otherwise ready to commit it looking at that as a 
whole, that's what you want to analyze and apply on a 
whole to the situation. 
Let's talk about Ms. Randie and what we know 
about her. She testified this morning and the State 
called her and asked her some questions about what 
happened. She was not very clear on what occurred on 
this event There were a lot of things she couldn't 
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reminder, either from the state or from myself, she was 1 
able to remember a few more details. But she was a 1 
little foggy on what happened in some of them. 1 think 
in other situations, she didn't know what was going on 1 
or she misrepresented what was going on. At first she 
said she didn't have a conversation with Patrick Stanley 
by herself, but when 1 asked her more questions about 
that she said she did. and gave us some more details 
about that 
1 think that her story changed a little bit 
as it went on, and maybe some of that is because she was 
just reciting from memory and it was back in March. But 
1 think she was also willing to misrepresent the truth. 
And 1 think that is evidenced by a couple of things. 
One, it is relevant that when she testified in these 
proceedings previously she said she didn't have a 
criminal history. Then we find out she did have some 
misdemeanor convictions from a couple of years ago. And 
that she maybe was unclear as to when 1 was asking that 
question. But when 1 asked her the question, if she had 
had a criminal history, she said, no, she didn't 1 
think it's also important when in weighing her testimony 
and credibility, as we stated before, she has been 
convicted previously with conspiracy to defraud the 
federal government And all of those are things that 
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you can weigh in assessing her credibility. 
And Ms Ragan has stated that Edie Randie has 
no reason to lie, she has no reason to come today and 
lie about the facts as they occurred. 1 want you to 
think about that. She did 170 controlled buys, at $75 a 
piece in about a six to nine month time period is how 
long she testified. This was her source of income. 
This is how she made her livelihood. Even though she 
was in custody, and that was a priority to her as well. 
fixing the problem and showing the state that she is a 
witness that's willing to testify, or that she is 
willing to do what they have asked her to do by coming 
here and making the facts appear as believable as 
possible. I think she does have incentive to lie. and 
what she was paid and what she was given by the state, 
in general, I think, is applicable in this case, and she 
was a paid confidential informant and you can weigh 
that in assessing her credibility. 
She also admitted on the stand she is a drug 
user and uses methamphetamine. Officer Mangum testified 
for us earlier that it's very common that confidential 
informants are either past drug users or current drug 
users and that is not an unusual situation. And she 
stated that she had used that - 1 believe she stated 
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ail of that is essential in weighing the testimony, and 
what she has to say. And her testimony is essential and 
important because there were times, and it's the times 
that Patrick Stanley has told you were the most 
important in terms of what she said to him, and what she 
did with him, it was just the two of them, it was 
Patrick Stanley and Edie Randle in that car, and it was 
Patrick Stanley and Edie Randle in the bathroom in the 
motel. And officer Mangum and none of the other 
officers couldn't hear, and that's when the entrapment 
occurred. And Patrick Stanley verses Edie Randle in 
terms of what happened during those times is what you 
have. She said - and she offered she never got into 
his car. and she didn't do that. And Patrick Stanley 
has told you that she did. And that they had a 
discussion about what she needed and what she wanted. 
And also when they were in the motel room, she had a 
discussion about what he was able to get and what he 
wasn't able to gel 
And also talking about Ms. Randle it's 
important to see - it's important to talk about what 
she knew about Patrick Stanley. She had told him her 
husband died in a mining accident and she was having 
financial difficulties, and she had allowed him to help 
her previously. He had been down to her house and he 
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testified that he had helped her fix things around the 
house. He had fixed a pick up or car that was out back i 
that he thought was for her daughter. They had a 
general friendship in that way. But most of the things 
that occurred, from what Patrick Stanley described, were 
him helping her, if she was in need of help. And he 
also testified that once - that when she needed money 
to make a trailer payment, he gave her the $350.00 that 
she needed. 1 don't know whether or not she really 
needed it for a trailer payment or if she was 
misrepresenting that We don't know that But that's 
what was told to Patrick Stanley and that's why Patrick 
Stanley gave her the $350.00. Patrick felt like he had 
some Honor and some responsibility to help her that 
night And she knew because he had helped her 
previously, that she could count on that or she could 
use that against Nm. And that's what she did, and 
that's why he was the one that she picked. 
II want to talk about what the State has 
proven in this case. And remember, we've all said it 
before: The State has the burden of proof. And the 
State has to prove each of those elements by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt It is their burden, and 
let's talk about what they have proven. They have 
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County, and that she spoke to Patrick Stanley. She 
paged him, he called her back and that a phone call 
occurred. She told Nm she had been in the hospital. 
and she was - at one point and he stated that she also 
indicated that she had been there for a week; that she 
had rolled her truck and that's why she hadn't called 
Nm previously. Officer Mangum said she did mention the 
hospital, and that that's why she would be bringing a 
friend, and that is why she didn't have a ride to just 
come and see Patrick herself. And that phone call was 
the beginning of her using what she knew about Patrick, 
entrapping Nm into getting her the methamphetamine she 
needed. 
Let's talk about what happened in Spanish 
Fork. The State has proven there were a lot of officers 
there. And we've heard from several of the officers and 
what their responsibilities were, and what they all did. 
The bottom line is there was one officer who was there. 
and who spoke with Patrick Stanley. Most of the rest of 
them - some of them could hear over the body wire what 
was said when all three of them were together 
discussing, and some of them couldn't see or hear 
anything, but that they were there for security 
purposes. So we know there were a lot of officers 
there. 
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Everybody thought somebody else was making a 
tape, and nobody ended up making a tape, so we can't 
verify what came over the body wire except for what 
Patrick Stanley said he heard, and what Edie Randle said 
she heard and said, and what Officer Mangum can 
attribute to that. But that conversation would not be 
the conversation that happened between Edie and Patrick 
Stanley. And Officer Mangum testified there was a 
conversation that occurred outside of Ns presence and 
he doesn't know what was said. 
Officer Mangum also stated the reason they 
went to Spanish Fork, is because Patrick Stanley didn't 
want to just come down for a small time deal. He wanted 
to come down for a significant source of money, and he 
wasn't going to waste Ns time. Officer Mangum also 
stated that as far as he knew, Patrick didn't have any 
drugs with Nm, and that's what Patrick represented; he 
didn't have the methamphetamine, and he would have to go 
back to Salt Lake and get it or go back home as officer 
Mangum testified. If he didn't want to waste Ns time. 
and he wasn't doing it for small change, why did he go 
ail the way back to Salt Lake to get it? Why didn't he 
show up to the K-mart in Spanish Fork, if he thought 
what Edie had offered Nm on the phone and if he thought 
i-_ ..—.. _«.;.«_ «K«rA •<> Ar\ a Hmn Heal vuhv HiHn't h& do 
[ I ] it in Spanish Fork? 
[ 2] Officer Mangum testified he had passed the 
[ 3] test. He didn't feel like Patrick Stanley thought he 
[ 4 ] was an officer or that he was worried by whether or not 
[ 5] he was wearing a wire, anything like that He said he 
[ 6] felt like he had passed the test If that's the case, 
[ 7] and Patrick Stanley really intended to distribute 
[ 8] methamphetamine to Edie Randle that night why didn't he 
[ 9] just do it in Spanish Fork? The state can't tell you 
[10] why - didn't do that And I think there's a good 
[ I I ] reason why he didn't do that because that's not what 
[12] his intention was when he went to Spanish Fork. He went 
[13] to Spanish Fork in order to pick up the $350 that Edie 
[14] Randle said she would pay Nm back. That's what was 
[15] said to him over the phone and that's why he went there. 
[16] The state also, in their case, have alleged 
[17] that Patrick was gone for a period of time, and when he 
[18] came back to Lehi that they were in a motel room; that 
[19] Patrick and Edie had a conversation in the bathroom, and 
[20] then they came out, and the drugs, the methamphetamine 
[21] and the money changed hands. Now the officer has 
[22] testified that Patrick gave that to Nm directly. 
[23] Patrick has testified that he gave that to Edie. and J 
[24] don't believe that Edie could remember or testify as to 
[25] what happened there. And the state has proven that 
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[ 1] occurred. But the state hasn't been able to prove that 
[ 2] didn't occur because of Pat's concern about the welfare 
[ 3] of Edie Randle. And that is Ns perspective. That is 
[ 4] the main perspective I want you to take back in that 
[ 5] jury room with you, is he was concerned for her and 
[ 6] worried about her safety and he wasn't going to leave 
[ 7] her there. And he was going to do what he needed to do 
[ 8 ] to help her And again, the state has said that their 
[ 9] relationship was not one that would inspire such 
[10] concern, but that's not true. Patrick has told you that 
[11] he was worried about her and she was a friend. She 
[12] testified that she was relying on her friendship with 
[13] Patrick for Nm to get her the methamphetamine. She was 
[14] relying on that. That's what Ns response was, and 
[15] that's what occurred there. They did have a friendsNp. 
[16] They didn't know all of each other's friends or know 
[17] everything about each other, but they were friends and 
[18] he has testified to that and so has she. 
[19] Pat has admitted to you he knows people who 
[20] have used methamphetamine, and he's admitted to you of 
[21] possessing methamphetamine in 1994. He knew when she 
[22] asked for the methamphetamine, that although he didn't 
[23] have any, and he is not a drug dealer, that he could 
[24] probably get some contacts and he could probably find 
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efforts that he went through to get that And that is a 
big admission from Patrick, that he knew that he had 
been convicted of that previously, and that he knew 
people who used drugs. But you can't take that and say 
because he knows people who use drugs, he is a drug 
dealer. Those aren't the same thing, and they're not 
equal 
He has testified that he knew where to go to 
get it and because he felt that Edie Randle was in 
need, he was willing to go through the steps to do it 
And he told you he is not a drug dealer, and he does not 
make a living doing that And what occurred on that 
night is contrary to what he does and what he is. 
Hindsight in this case is 20 /20 . The state 
has said: Why didn't he call the police? Why didn't he 
just walk away? Why didn't he do those things? That's 
easy to say at this point It wasn't easy for Patrick 
Stanley to stay on that night but he didn't feel like 
he could walk away. He didn't feel like he could call 
the police. He didn't know what else to do, except for 
help out Edie Randle. And that's what he did. 
There are some other things that the State 
has put into evidence that I want to talk about, and 
specifically the car and the things that were found in 



























lab testified that some of the those things found in the 
car could be used to manufacturer methamphetamine. The 
bottom line is, it wasn't Ns car. And second thing is, 
all of the things they found could be used for legal 
purposes. They could be used for camping purposes. 
They could be used in - I forget some of the other ones 
that were testified to, furniture or to strip furniture 
or strip paint off of tNngs All ol those tNngs, even 
if they were Patrick Stanley's, could have been in that 
car for legal purposes. But the bottom line is Patrick 
told you they were not Ns tNngs. and it's in Joel's 
car and he was borrowing Joel's car while Joel borrowed 
Ns truck. And those tNngs should not color your view 
of what Patrick Stanley is or what Patrick Stanley did 
that night Because those, for one thing, are not 
elements of the crime, and they don't make it any more 
or less likely that he was entrapped. 
We've talked a lot about the $350, and we've 
talked a lot about what it was for, and what the 
understanding of the two parties was about that $350. 
And Edie has told you it was for a past drug deal. 
Patrick has told you it was for the house trailer 
payment And the only other people we would have to 
verify what the purpose of that was for, is Susan Webb, 
her daughter Ryan and Tiffany, who didn't testify but 
I Page 36 
[ 1 ] 
I [2] 
I [3] 
[ 4 ] 
I [5] 
[ 6 ] 
[ 7 ] 
I [8] 

















would have testified similarly to Susan, that that $350 
was for the trailer payment and that's important 
because that's why Patrick Stanley went to the K-mart in 
Spanish Fork, was to recoup that $350 debt that he had. 
I want to talk for a second about the 
drug-free zone. The instructions the Court has given 
you is that in order to establish something by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt you have to determine that 
based only on the legal evidence presented in court. 
Officer Terr/ testified that there was a McDonalds 
across the street and down the block, and that across 
the next major street there is also a school over there. 
And he testified that he believes, and he has seen 
information that would indicate that is within a 
thousand feet of where this occurred in the motel in 
LeN. Now, what we have then is that Officer Terry 
believes it is within a thousand feet. And that that 
makes it a drug free zone. 
But my question to you is has that been 
proven to you here in court based only upon the legal 
evidence presented in court? Does that meet the state's 
burden to prove that beyond a reasonable doubt? And if 
it doesn't, that's an element of the offense, and they 
haven't proved their case, if they haven't proved that's 
within a thousand feet 
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The bottom line in this case is, did Patrick 
Stanley knowingly and intentionally distribute 
methamphetamine, and did he knowingly and intentionally 
possess or use methamphetamine? The court - or the 
State has focused on his use of methamphetamine and said 
that the officer saw him snort methamphetamine out of 
that box, and Patrick has told you that's not what 
happened, and that's not what he did, but that he was 
blowing the stuff out of the box, and he blue it out to 
clean it out and he stuck it back in his packet And 
that is what his testimony is. And his testimony is 
believable, and Ns testimony should be looked at in 
light of Ns perspective and in light of what happened 
to him there. 
He's testified that he's - that he had, four 
years ago, been convicted of that possession charge. 
And he also has testified that he doesn't have the same 
lifestyle that he had then, and he has changed and he is 
a different man. And all of that goes to whether or not 
you believe him or you believe the officer's testimony. 
And based upon everything that has happened in this 
case, I thin*: that the evidence shows that Patrick 
Stanley's testimony is believable, and that he sits 
before you today, and he was willing to own up to the 
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some things that could be interpreted in different ways 
and he told you the truth about what happened on March 
27th. 
The bottom line you have to look at is can 
you really say that Patrick Stanley acted knowingly and 
intentionally? And if you look at the entrapment 
statute and apply the language that is there, that 
entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or 
person directed by or acting in cooperation with the 
officer, induces the commission of an offense in order 
to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the offense 
would be committed by one otherwise not ready to commit 
it 
Patrick Stanley wasn't ready to commit that 
offense. And he wasn't there to sell drugs. And if 
what they did was contrary to the entrapment statute. 
and if what Edie Randle told him and said to Nm in the 
car and in the bathroom shows that he was entrapped. 
then you can't say that he acted knowingly and 
intentionally. 
Thank you again for being here, and thank you 
for taking your job seriously, and thank you for 
weighing the evidence fairly and impartially. We would 
ask that you come back with a verdict of not guilty on 
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both of the charges that Patrick Stanley is facing 
today. 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
Ms. Ragan? 
MS RAGAN: Thank you. Judge. 
Ladies and gentlemen, when you came into this 
courthouse you were not required to throw away your 
common sense. That's what counsel is asking to you do. 
if you're to believe the story the defendant told you. 
It's your right to use the common sense you have, to 
judge whether or not the things that he says happened 
and Edie Randle said happened, what makes sense. 
1 asked the defendant about whether or not he 
had access to the police report the transcripts and 
those items. And 1 did that for a specific reason. 
because it was obvious to me that what he had done is 
sat down and gone through each of those things and 
fashioned his story so he absolutely had no 
responsibility for anything in this case. And even to 
the point that he says if he touched that box, then it 
was knocked out of Ns hands when the police came in. 
It was just ridiculous to even imagine that 
anyone could have had that series of events happen, that 
add up to Nm having no responsibility for absolutely 
Addendum F 
INSTRU^ON^NO^—2_ 
The essential elements of the crime\:harged in 40toggai9of the Amended Information are as 
follows: 
if) That the defendant, Patrick Stanley, 
(2) On or about March 27, 1997, 
In Utah County, Utah, 
4£? Did knowingly and intentionally, 
/v$) Use."' JWs«& 
@ Methamphetamine, 
. $)• A Schedule !! controlled substance, 
® In a drug free zone, 
5 ) And had previously been convicted of possession of a controlled substance on fibfrftrin*' 
••', p#mm h^\ !^i. • 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more 
of the above essential elements of the crime, you should find the defendant not guilty. On the other 
hand, if the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense as 
set forth above, then you should find the defendant guilty of the crime. 
